

Strategy Research Project

Multinational Training Opportunities in the Asia-Pacific

by

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Class of 2013

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
<p>The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</p>					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) xx-03-2013		2. REPORT TYPE STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT		3. DATES COVERED (From - To)	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Multinational Training Opportunities in the Asia-Pacific				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Mr. Leonard A. Housley Department of Army Civilian				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Mr. Robert C. Coon Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College 122 Forbes Avenue Carlisle, PA 17013				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Distribution A: Approved for Public Release. Distribution is Unlimited.					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES Word Count: 6,499					
14. ABSTRACT <p>The Asia-Pacific is emerging as a regional global challenge for many nations. These challenges transcend militarily to the United States (U.S.), its allies, and U.S. Asia-Pacific regional partners. Department of Defense Strategic Guidance envelops a need for increased combined training requirements, however, facing declining budgets and a new fiscal reality. The U.S. has limited facilities in the Asia-Pacific to support large scale multi-national land component force-on-force training including incorporation of air and naval combined arms support. In Europe, overtime, the U.S. has established the Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) with a resident Joint Multinational Combat Training Center (JMRC) in the European theater. Without a definitive equivalent of JMTC and JMRC in the Asia-Pacific, coupled with changes to the Defense Strategy, how should the U.S. approach establishing multinational training opportunities in the Asia-Pacific? This SRP examines possible ways of supporting multinational training to accomplish the end as stated in the Defense Strategy tied to limited means.</p>					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Joint Operations, Combat Training Centers, Readiness, Partnership Capacity Building					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 36	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT UU	b. ABSTRACT UU	c. THIS PAGE UU			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

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Abstract

Title: Multinational Training Opportunities in the Asia-Pacific

Report Date: March 2013

Page Count: 36

Word Count: 6,499

Key Terms: Joint Operations, Combat Training Centers, Readiness, Partnership Capacity Building

Classification: Unclassified

The Asia-Pacific is emerging as a regional global challenge for many nations. These challenges transcend militarily to the United States (U.S.), its allies, and U.S. Asia-Pacific regional partners. Department of Defense Strategic Guidance envelops a need for increased combined training requirements, however, facing declining budgets and a new fiscal reality. The U.S. has limited facilities in the Asia-Pacific to support large scale multi-national land component force-on-force training including incorporation of air and naval combined arms support. In Europe, overtime, the U.S. has established the Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) with a resident Joint Multinational Combat Training Center (JMRC) in the European theater. Without a definitive equivalent of JMTC and JMRC in the Asia-Pacific, coupled with changes to the Defense Strategy, how should the U.S. approach establishing multinational training opportunities in the Asia-Pacific? This SRP examines possible ways of supporting multinational training to accomplish the end as stated in the Defense Strategy tied to limited means.

Multinational Training Opportunities in the Asia-Pacific

The foundation of United States, regional, and global security will remain America's relations with our allies, and our commitment to their security is unshakable. These relationships must be constantly cultivated, not just because they are indispensable for U.S. interests and national security objectives, but because they are fundamental to our collective security. Alliances are force multipliers: through multinational cooperation and coordination, the sum of our actions is always greater than if we act alone.

—National Security Strategy 2010

Introduction

The above quote gets at the very essence of the extreme importance for multinational operations as part of an overall effective U.S. military strategy. Asia-Pacific is a global economic driving force that possesses the majority of great powers, nuclear weapons, and one-third of the world's population. The security challenges are piracy, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, natural resources, territorial state and sea trade disputes. Transitioning the balance of power toward Asia is vital to U.S. interests.¹ Achieving the balance of power in Asia will require ally and partner nation support to achieve success. Specifically, how does the Asia-Pacific changing environment relate to Army land component (ground forces) training and readiness mutually supported by the Marines and ground forces of our multinational partners? Asia-Pacific is viewed by many leaders as a naval and air requirement for military planning to deter aggression. I agree that naval and air forces will play a larger role in any conflict in this region, however, ground forces must equally be trained to achieve overall victory. As we have seen throughout history, the inability to fight the enemy on land, hold territory, and limit enemies from sustaining naval and air forces negatively impacts the overall success in conflicts and can lead to a protracted state of affairs. Currently, the U.S. military

strategy in the Asia-Pacific has been referred to as “hub-n-spoke” with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines, and Thailand.² The Army has been using the “hub-n-spoke” concept to sustain training and readiness in order to achieve efficiencies and cost savings around the globe. Combat missions in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown the vital importance for well-trained battalion and brigade ground forces and the synchronization with multinational partners at the tactical level. Training and readiness is achieved through live, virtual, and constructive training at home stations with culminating events at combat training centers. The fog and friction of war can never be removed; however live training events conducted at CTCs have proven to prepare leaders and soldiers to better counter the uncertainties of war--Multinational coalition training is equally enhanced. Cold war and post-cold war environmental changes in Europe have produced a U.S. Army led Joint Multinational Training Command established in 2005. Although this capability evolved over many years, the Asia-Pacific has no equal entity in the region to provide training and readiness for multinational ground operations.³ This paper will analyze the merits for such a capability to enhance training and readiness, build U.S. confidence, and strengthen partner capacity and alliances for emerging threats.

China’s Rise

Is China a threat militarily to U.S. or its allies? The premise for the U.S. pivot to the Pacific region is underpinned by the rise and perceived threat of China. China claims they want a peaceful rise to superpower status; however China is currently on track to be the world’s largest military investor over the next 20 years. Some political analysts agree that the silent rise of China is to posture itself to be able to intervene with western involvement into what China sees as purely Asia matters and interests. China

purports no interests in expanding its borders or engaging into sovereign nations, but the world views Taiwan and the East and South China Sea territorial disputes as a clear China objective for control. China is expected to maintain military spending of 12% each year and increase investments further as long as their economy remains free of increases in social spending. China is vastly investing in asymmetric capabilities and the cyber incidents and threats are a top U.S. priority to counter.⁴ China's last form of aggression was in 1979 in Vietnam and since focused on diplomatic and economic growth and engagement. Beijing offers no explanation for the military growth except to defend its borders from foreign aggression and have a military commensurate with the west.⁵

China's ground forces are modernizing to state-of-the-art with technology and an increasing focus on mobile expeditionary capabilities. The Army land component in China remains dominant and their Army generals continue to hold most of the senior positions. While China is decreasing its overall land component active end strength, the steadfast modernization efforts should be a concern. China is improving their capabilities in air-ground integrated operations, long-distance maneuvers, assaults, and special operations. China has 33 divisions consisting of 60 Army and Marine Brigades of which approximately 12 brigades are rapid reaction focused spread amongst three airborne divisions. Additionally, they have two amphibious infantry divisions and seven special operations groups. To offset the active decrease in the land component, China has built up 40 reserve divisions with over 800,000 troops. China has also invested and enhanced training and readiness operations. They have developed a noncommissioned officer core and decreased commissioned officer

strength and built combined tactical training centers to replicate real-world scenarios for combat. China's Army is still behind U.S. and NATO forces but has passed Taiwan, India, Japan and Vietnam in size and training and readiness.⁶ The U.S. military is known for its leading edge in training and readiness, so China's military progression surpassing our allies and partners in the region should be of great concern and cause question as to how we assist and help improve our multinational alliance and coalition posture.

Policy and Doctrine

The United States (U.S.) National Defense Strategy purports that we will continue to face violent transnational extremist networks, hostile states armed with, or trying to acquire, weapons of mass destruction, rising regional powers (such as China), and even more sophisticated emerging space and cyber threats.⁷ These challenges not only face the U.S., but face every nation and non-nation globally. So, our U.S. political objectives, or ends, are to "Defend the Homeland, Win the Long War, Promote Security, Deter Conflict, and Win our Nation's Wars."⁸ Given the current fiscal environment of defense budgets, increasing partnership capacity in the Asia region becomes important for sharing the costs in order to capitalize on spreading a cohesive multinational land force alliance to deter and sustain security. "Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities."⁹ Thus, U.S. policy has provided our ends for which the application of ways and means must be established at all levels of military planning. Recently, the Secretary of the Army released his top ten priorities and number three is, "Enhance Army activities in the Asia-Pacific region."¹⁰

Multinational Operations

The paragraph above provides Commander-in-Chief and Secretary of the Army's intent as it relates to the Army-Land Component. Reliance on exercises and a rotational presence translates to ways and means for both joint and multinational partnership capacity building. For simplicity, "joint operations" refers to U.S. service component interoperability and "multinational operations" is the graduating process where other nations operate alongside the U.S. military in either an alliance or coalition to defeat or deter an adversary. Alliances and coalitions form multinational teaming that multiply the strength of U.S. forces and the U.S. remains committed to sustaining and growing long standing alliances.¹¹ Coalitions with partner nations willing to support permanent alliances should be anticipated and fostered for common national goals. However, beyond paper agreements, alliances and coalitions provide little benefit without action in the form of executing multinational training and standardization of national equipment, doctrine, and tactics, techniques & procedures (TTPs). Multinational exercises are critical components of training, future planning, collaboration, and doctrine refinement.¹² Exercises come in many forms from theater level battle staff exercises where many nations might participate to company level field training exercises with only one partner. Full Interoperability is not achieved through technical gadgetry alone; the main components to successful multinational operations are the human based interactions and relationships established over time and through repetition. Nations can have the best doctrine and interoperable command and control systems, however if there is no relationship that is fostered and cultivated, overall success will be hindered.¹³ "The climate of cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region is very conducive to multilateral dialogue and the development of effective strategic,

operational, and tactical planning and execution skills to meet on-going and emergent security challenges.”¹⁴

Joint Multinational Training Command

Unlike the European region, the Asia-Pacific has no dedicated Joint Multinational Command such as 7th Army’s Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) located in Germany. “JMTC is the largest training command outside the continental U.S.”¹⁵ and has evolved overtime from primarily a U.S. Army supported training and readiness agency to a U.S. Army, joint, and multinational focus. JMTC is a separate command that reports directly to the USAREUR Commander and charged with synchronizing all training and readiness support functions. JMTC is comprised of many capabilities, four of which are the Grafenwoehr Training Area that provides sophisticated live-fire gunnery ranges; A simulations center that provides collective gaming up to constructive theater level exercises; The Combined Arms Training Center (CATC) that provides functional and institutional training focused at the individual level; and a sub-command, the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) that serves as one of the Army’s capstone maneuver combat training centers (CTC) focused on Individual/Squad/Platoon collective to Battalion/Brigade live training exercises. Some of these capabilities exist throughout the Pacific region today except for a CTC and no one agency (Training Command) dedicated to planning and executing training to face current and projected threats. Overall, JMTC provides state-of-the-art training for multinational partners and allies that proliferates building partnership capacity and security force assistance. 7th Army’s JMTC provides the full gambit of live, virtual, constructive, simulation, and gaming enablers and is the only training command that regularly trains and prepares multinational partners for operations in Afghanistan. Not only does JMTC train

multinational units practically every day, but has trained mentors from over 27 countries in order to serve as operational mentor liaison teams. Since the transition into JMTC from an Army training center in 2005, JMTC has gained much recognition and has hosted over 200 visits comprised of over 600 diplomats and leaders from Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia and the U.S.¹⁶ The key component to JMTC is JMRC's CTC capability that provides realistic live force-on-force training to U.S. Army, Joint services, and multinational partners. This environment allows for the synchronization of TTPs and doctrine to ensure successful combat ready partners to defeat and deter aggression.¹⁷ The fog and friction of battle is not only high for U.S. commanders, but can be exacerbated more in a multinational environment. Thus, JMRC provides the rigor to test and reduce the fog and friction in future operations through live training events with other nation partners to comprehend the collective strategy on the battlefield. As the U.S. pivots to the Asia-Pacific with reliance on partners and allies, multinational training operations for this region must endure the same rigor as provided by JMRC—a capability not yet resident in the region. The U.S. Army provides two other CTCs; the National Training Center located in Fort Irwin, California and the Joint Readiness Training Center located at Fort Polk, Louisiana. Funding for these centers are expensive however CTC's role in providing combat ready forces is invaluable and they serve as combat multipliers for success in war.

Land Force Requirement

Since the Soviet Union and the threat of the cold war, the Army and other services have moved from focusing on conventional forces with predicted force structure to full spectrum operations; a fundamental doctrine previously followed for years when facing a potential conventional enemy of similar structure in defense as our

own. We have been engaged in asymmetrical combat more typical to guerrilla warfare in the Middle East for over ten years. As we look to the future, our new enemies could present a threat much like that of the soviet-union in concept and drives the need for force-on-force proficiency.¹⁸ The new priorities for the twenty first century defense are the shift towards the Asia-Pacific and require strengthening and synchronizing partners and alliances in the region. A force such as China will focus U.S. and multinational land component tactics towards conventional forces if conflict ensues. However, similar to Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has assisted partners in Asia to combat terrorism and counter insurgency thus requiring equal focus on force-on-force and full spectrum operations as we look towards future threats in the Asia-Pacific region. Land component support to the region cannot be primarily U.S. alone. The former U.S. solution to German basing during the cold war to counter the soviet threat will be a less supported strategy for China by U.S. political leaders coupled with planned stark Department of Defense fiscal reductions. This will result in a greater need for comprehensive partner nation dependency in the form of multinational land component alliances and robust training under theater security cooperation programs.¹⁹ Multinational partnering with other land forces must be synchronized to meet ends as stated in the U.S. National Military Strategy. The Pacific basin poses various scenarios that could arise and many are primary missions of the U.S. Army and seven of the ten largest armies are found in U.S. Pacific Command's (PACOM) area of responsibility. Of the seven, China, North Korea, Russia and South Korea have historically relied on land forces to solve military disputes. Russia may not provide the threat to the U.S. as it once did, however the future is hard to predict and China is increasing and modernizing

its force and North Korea remains an unpredictable threat. U.S. Land forces in the Pacific region have and will continue to provide security and stability to deter potential armed aggression.²⁰ In a broader context, U.S. land forces in Asia have solidified military cooperation since the 1990s and have enjoyed mutual investments with host partner states bolstering U.S. land component participation with multinational ground forces in the Pacific region nations such as Australia, India, Japan, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand. This progress postures a unified alliance that potential adversaries are unlikely to match and U.S. land components must continue to further this relationship and increase training and readiness.²¹

Land Domain Manager

The U.S. Army serves as the land domain manager and this domain is the most complex due to the human factor. Ground forces must deal with the people—a critical component of the Clausewitzian trinity—and accomplish most missions up close and personal. Land forces take the brunt of casualties and are exposed directly to chaos, death, and destruction. Soldiers can rarely engage the enemy without managing the battlefield environment that comprises both combatants and non-combatants. Ground combat operation's success is determined through competent actions and decisions during all phases of a campaign.²² The Army uses air and naval joint integration to enhance and succeed in ground operations and it is rarely the reverse in any war. "No major conflict has ever been won without boots on the ground."²³ There are few occasions where aerial and naval bombardment influences changes in bad state actors, but these efforts never win a war without ground force presence.

The Army must prevent, shape and win our nation's wars in a Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) environment. To prevent or deter war, we

must provide credible forces that leaves no doubt that we are a lethal force capable of defeating any and all enemies under any conditions. One key to providing a credible force is through rigorous multifaceted training at all levels to attain proficiency. Shaping is acquiring nation alliances and partners to help us contain mutual enemies. Building partnerships is the first step and is followed by our assistance in defending themselves through capacity building, training, and multinational exercises. Multinational operations in war are critical to prevent access denial, gain geostrategic advantages and defeat the enemy. To win, we must be able to attack and defend while conducting decisive land ground combat operations and enhance our power through synchronizing joint and multinational operations.²⁴ The Army fights in BCT formations at the Brigade and below level. CTCs offer the best simulated combat realism to train as we fight along multinational partners at the BCT level where the most casualties and fog of war take place. The Asia-Pacific must provide the opportunity to conduct multinational combat training to prevent, shape and win wars.

Implications of Air-Sea Battle Doctrine

To be successful in war, the U.S. must have a robust ability to deploy forces across the globe--power projection. The key contributing factor in the success of power projection is forward deployed forces and strong alliances with other nations.²⁵ Why is the Air-Sea Battle Doctrine relevant to the land component and what is the doctrine missing? The current draft focuses on anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD); and China's investment in anti-air, ship, and long range weaponry infers that China's strategic goal is to limit power-projection capabilities from all adversaries.²⁶ The ideas behind the doctrine are relevant and provide forward planning; however ground power is only a mere thought and requires refinement to include the land component commensurate

with air and naval planning efforts. The shift to the Asia-Pacific military planning efforts requires funding and ground forces play a key role in A2/AD by: “Countering the effects of adversary actions against the air, sea, space, and cyberspace domains by locating/seizing/neutralizing/destroying land based capabilities that threaten those domains.”²⁷

The land component accomplishes this mission through assault and strike operations from forward-deployed power projection platforms through alliances that are safe from the enemies reach. This posturing has been a mission of the land component throughout our history and the U.S. Army and Marines have been successful in building alliances and securing bases from regional partners.²⁸ Through training and readiness, the land component builds partner capacity to establish relationships and capitalize on multinational capabilities through support agreements. The overall success to defeat A2/D2 is U.S. forward deployed ground forces linked with multinational partners for first strike operations to limit sustained enemy A2/AD actions. Therefore, the start point is resourcing a training and readiness capability equal to efforts being considered for the U.S. air and naval forces.

Challenges and Opportunities

U.S. Army Chief of Staff GEN Ray Odierno purports ground forces will play a vital role in the Asia-Pacific strategy.²⁹ The mission in the Pacific region will be met with both challenges and opportunities. After over 10 years of persistent conflict in the Middle East and troop withdrawals from Iraq and planned withdrawals from Afghanistan, the Army will again reduce force structure while China is modernizing and growing reserve forces. GEN Odierno has acknowledged that the U.S. Army must “actively seek new opportunities”³⁰ and these come in the form of expanded multinational training and

theater security cooperation in the Pacific. The existing Army and Marine force structure in the Pacific region provides an adequate ready force for deterrence, but will rely heavily on alliances and coalitions to win wars if and when the situation arises. The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process used to supply forces to the Middle East will by default incorporate the total force for missions identified for contingency planning for the evolving Asia-Pacific missions. Since increased stationing in the Pacific is restricted by fiscal challenges and troop reductions, rotational training and readiness exercises will need to flow into the Pacific similar to forces flowing into the Middle East. The opportunity is that as forces withdraw from the Middle East, units will become available for new missions and focus on building better coalitions with partner nations through joint and multinational training.

U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)

Any threat to the Asia-Pacific region that conflicts with U.S. interests or threatens regional stability will be countered under PACOM as the Geographical Combatant Commander. The Asia-Pacific is comprised of half the earth's surface and diversified culturally, socially, and economically by 36 nations and 3000 different languages. Within PACOM's AOR, the U.S. has five ally nations through mutual defense treaties—Australia, South Korea, Japan, Philippines, and Thailand. The ground components of PACOM are provided by U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) and Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC). Grounds forces assigned to PACOM are three Army divisions comprised of eight brigade combat teams, three combat aviation brigades, and two fires brigades. The Marines provide two Marine expeditionary forces with ground combat power from two Marine divisions.³¹

Posture of USARPAC

Since the start of the Global War on Terror as a result of attacks on the U.S. in September 2001, coupled with sustaining operations over eleven years in Iraq and Afghanistan, USARPAC experienced challenges in the form of interoperability and transformation. Army modularity concept of force distribution provided from USARPAC through Army force generation pulled resources away from transformation efforts and multinational interoperability goals in the Pacific region.³² However, USARPAC has adjusted well and made significant strides for improving training & readiness and building partnership capacity with multinational forces. For the first time, USARPAC's high ranking Deputy Commanding General is an Australian Major General and this partnering will promote USARPAC's mission in providing unified land operations. The transition of 8th Army under USARPAC as an Army Service Component Command (ASCC) enhances PACOM's expeditionary capability and flexibility. 8th Army's vast experience with Theater Security Cooperation compliments capability that will reside under one ASCC.³³

USARPAC's Role in the Theater Security Cooperation Program (TSCP)

As America's largest theater Army, USARPAC's TSCP is highly successful through multinational engagements for humanitarian assistance, peace operations, stability, and reconstruction. Each year since 2010, USARPAC participates in over 200 TSCP events annually to improve U.S. joint and multinational interoperability and conducts the largest multinational exercises in the world. In 2010, under the direction of LTG Mixon former USARPAC commander, USARPAC completed the establishment of the Asia-Pacific counter-IED center to provide training programs, intelligence products, and partner nation capacity building to enhance chances of survival and reduce

casualties for both U.S. and multinational partners. Additionally, due to Army transformation initiatives, large investments have built and modernized training infrastructure and enablers across the Pacific region especially in Alaska and Hawaii.³⁴

LTG Wiercinski, Commanding General, USARPAC is leading Army efforts in the Pacific to support the 2012 defense strategy for the 21st Century. USARPAC's focus is to enable, build, and foster U.S. projection power through teaming of allies and partners in the region to deter aggression. As USARPAC forces return from the Middle East, multinational exercise programs will serve as the third component of readiness behind U.S. forces training at home-station training and conducting CTC rotations. The main goal for multinational training is to build credibility, confidence, and trust with allies and partners for regional stability in the Asia-Pacific.³⁵

Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Capability (JPMRC)

Well into planning and setting conditions for success, USARPAC has developed the JPMRC to provide an exportable Pacific theater combat training center experience with and initial operating capability by FY15.³⁶ This capability is first focused at the Battalion and Brigade Combat Team (BCT) level for U.S. ground forces supported by observer controllers, instrumentation, training aids, devices, simulators, simulations and joint enablers. The priority will be for BCTs to train at home station prior to their resident CTC rotation.³⁷ The JPMRC program is planned to be implemented in three phases of which the last phase will provide an exportable training capability to support multinational training at the BCT level by FY18.³⁸ The JPMRC is not currently designed to replace U.S. Army BCT's resident CTC rotation but to complement home station training. Additionally, the JPMRC is not a dedicated mobile capability for multinational training support to our allies and partners in the region.

U.S. Force Posture Strategy

As a result of President Obama's FY12 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)³⁹ under section 346, a force posture strategy was mandated and published for PACOM.⁴⁰ This strategy also outlines posture for the PACOM Commander to execute capacity building for nation partners and joint and combined training to enhance interoperability for multinational coalitions. "U.S. force posture must demonstrate a readiness and capacity to fight and win, even under more challenging circumstances associated with A2/AD."⁴¹ The Army portion of the defense budget is decreasing and fiscal challenges are a planning factor; however the posture strategy does caution that current funding may not meet mission requirements to sustain regional stability. It is advised that the U.S. must recognize that future increases in defense budgets to support the Asia-Pacific might be necessary, especially to secure potential benefits through new partnerships and stronger alliances.⁴² The regional study provides over 100 pages of stationing and command relations for the region but does not address a functional or multinational training command, or the need for one such as JMTTC in Europe. It does address expanding multinational exercises and transfer of the JPMRC to PACOM. I would argue that inclusion of the two sentence reference to JPMRC was upon result of the USARPAC initiative and was not part of any real in-depth findings based on the independent assessment.⁴³ The U.S. force posture strategy for the Asia-Pacific lacks future investment support for the ways and means for building stronger alliances through training and readiness for the land component--there is an increase in mission and a decrease in funding.

An increased U.S. presence in Australia would expand multinational partnerships with Indonesia, other Southeast Asia countries and India. Australia is troubled over

China's development of A2/AD from a cyber and freedom of navigation standpoint.⁴⁴

Australia is also concerned about an unstable region and an increase of U.S. support in Australia could benefit both nations in solidifying and building stronger alliances. This opportunity will depend on both U.S. and Australian defense spending for rebalancing efforts towards the Asia-Pacific.⁴⁵

U.S. and Australian Alliance

Australia has a large supportive interest in the U.S. maintaining strategic leadership in the Asia-Pacific to maintain regional stability. Australia has maintained a mutual defense treaty with the U.S. since 1951 and continues to benefit both economically and peacefully through U.S. hegemony. Recently, the Australian Prime Minister supports and embraces U.S. policy to pivot and rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific, and is committed to increase military partnerships with the U.S.⁴⁶ Australia has already agreed "that by 2015, up to 2,500 Marines will be based in, and rotate through facilities in Darwin."⁴⁷ Australia is a geostrategic ally more relevant than ever as the U.S. pivots and develops updated strategies for the Asia-Pacific region. Besides Japan, Australia is sure to support as an ally should China rise and challenge U.S. interests militarily and the U.S. would support Australia in kind. Australia has a long history of supporting the U.S. politically, but has provided military support as well.

China's investment in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities makes Australia geographically more attractive to U.S. interests in global defense. Australia is planned to serve a crucial player in the development of U.S. Air-Sea Battle doctrine and could serve as a "logistical hub for American long-range strike aircraft and submarines, and a major arsenal for America's strategic logistics."⁴⁸ Australia could also support power-projection for ground forces from the U.S. Army, Marines, and multinational land

components out of Darwin. Australia provides many training and readiness opportunities for the land component domain not only providing enhanced strategic depth to the U.S., but for U.S. joint multinational training with Japan, Indonesia, United Kingdom, Philippines, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore. Indonesia is interested in conducting joint military activities with Australia and Indonesia voiced no concern about the U.S. Marines in Darwin.⁴⁹ The U.S. has already made significant progress with relations in Indonesia and this interest in military-to-military training and exercises with Australia will strengthen partnership capacity amongst nations in the Pacific. PACOM has long worked diligently with Australia and Asia-Pacific nations' through military cooperation programs and the U.S. Army (USARPAC) has a vested interest in playing an integral part of the Air-Sea Battle doctrine. The Australian land forces are small compared to the U.S. but are highly trained, lethal and battle tested. This high state of readiness is derived from a dedicated comprehensive realistic training and exercise capability coupled with hardened experience from deployments. The Australian's First Division provides CTC-like training execution and can be deployed to command large scale ground operations if needed.⁵⁰ Australia's National Defense Strategy purports that the Australian-U.S. alliance is "our most important security relationship...the alliance has proved a critical enabler for the development of our own military capability."⁵¹ The Australian-U.S. alliance must continue to evolve and address emerging threats in the Asia-Pacific.⁵²

Analysis and Recommendations

As part of the mission for rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific, the U.S. Army must build partnership capacity and grow alliances. The U.S. Army has an opportunity to use

the momentum towards the Asia-Pacific in spite of the Air-Sea Battle attention that appears to receive favorable fiscal priorities over the Army. U.S. compared to most nations train ground forces differently. Air and naval training among other nations are very similar to U.S. operations. Air and sea domains remain largely the same in combat operations however ground forces face different topography, geographical, and cultural challenges with diverse missions from COIN to force-on-force conventional warfare. Therefore, ground forces require greater training and readiness demands prior to deployments. The integration of multinational land forces drives even a greater emphasis on training and readiness to achieve a true partnership capacity posture. The U.S. Army, Marines, and multinational partners are very proficient in COIN, but U.S. forces have reached a degraded state in force-on-force proficiency.⁵³ GEN Odierno acknowledged “erosion of the Army’s skills in force-on-force warfare after a decade of war”⁵⁴ while addressing the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Since the U.S. Army leads multinational partners in training, other nations are probably unskilled as well in conventional warfare. There must be a balance in remaining proficient in all aspects of full spectrum operations.

The U.S. continues to lead other nations in pre-deployment training, training methodologies, and advances in technologies to enhance training. Specifically, many nations have adopted our CTC model and have invested money and developed training management structures charged with oversight to execute realistic training for their forces—mostly in line with U.S. training and doctrine practices.⁵⁵

The Army CTC program is the capstone culminating event for ground forces at the Battalion or Brigade Combat Team (BCT) level that provides extreme realism and replicates the intensity of war. The CTC program serves as an “engine of change and a culture driver”⁵⁶ that resonates throughout the Army and establishes training standards

for commanders at home station. Thus the CTC serves two critical purposes: first, it provides the replicated Contemporary Operating Environment (COE)⁵⁷ for units to conduct operations and second, the CTC program provides the standards and lessons learned for commanders to apply across their training and readiness programs. CTCs provide leaders both strengths and weaknesses—The CTC program generates “a level of training superiority that has been credited for the successes achieved in operational missions.”⁵⁸ BCT modularity requires joint participation in order to train as we fight in the COE. JIIM as it relates to our multinational partners is planned and executed when applicable; however multinational participation at CTCs has been limited based on U.S. unit throughput capacity at the three Army CTCs.⁵⁹ The U.S. Army has been able to significantly increase multinational participation in the CTC at JRMCC primarily due to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe, thus allowing a dedicated CTC for joint multinational operations to support operations in the Middle East. The success of JIIM at JRMCC to produce trained and synchronized multinational partners operating amongst U.S. forces has gained worldwide accolades. The future test will be the ability to maintain a robust JIIM CTC capability for force-on-force rotations coupled with the fact that no such CTC capability exists in the Asia-Pacific. The ability to provide integrated ground combat multinational proficiency in the Asia-Pacific will be just as crucial to the ongoing multinational efforts conducted at JRMCC—a proven success. USARPAC’s current JPMRC planning concept will not address the full attention needed for multinational partners in the Asia-Pacific; nor is it intended to be such a program.

From a multinational leverage point, the U.S. Army should lead the establishment of a resident CTC joint multinational training capability in Australia. However, unlike

JMTC in Europe, develop a capability with nation cost sharing and staffed with military members from the current five nations that we have signed mutual defense treaties. Provide a former BCT Brigade Commander and staff with a robust mix of multinational officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers. Observer controllers and opposing forces could rotate from nation to nation which would enhance partner capacity and critical skills. This would reduce the costs to the U.S. and form a true multinational partnership for land component operations. This could subsequently be funded and staffed by partner nations that would want to participate, thus eventually providing an attractive incentive to solidifying further mutual defense or military cooperation treaties with nations in the Asia-Pacific. The proposed multinational CTC would not be designed for all U.S. BCTs in PACOM to conduct annual or bi-annual rotations, but reserved for multinational BCTs where a U.S. BCT would rotate through possibly two or more times a year. Additionally, as we have seen through ARFORGEN for the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, all Army BCTs were made available for deployment. Other U.S. BCTs could rotate through the multinational CTC in the Asia-Pacific to better prepare other geographic combatant command's forces for any future mission in that region. Australia has the land for maneuver and their location is less vulnerable to A2/AD efforts by China. The other U.S. services could provide minimal liaison staff to integrate the joint support for CTC operations. This concept would support the relevance of the land component and with the integration of air and naval exercises embedded in a BCT rotation, allows the Army to gain recognition of its important mission as land domain manager and validate scenarios for operations in the Asia-

Pacific. This capability should be managed by USARPAC under a sub-training command with agreements from regional partners.

Pacific Training Command

The USARPAC AOR is vast, non-contiguous, and has great training capabilities throughout the forward theater. With the current forward deployed training infrastructure and significant investments over the last 10 years, these resources should be managed and synchronized through a Pacific Training Command such as the JMTC existing in Europe. Again, the structure for the Pacific Training Command should be developed beyond the scope of JMTC and incorporate a deputy commander and staff from multinational partners and located in Hawaii under command of USARPAC. PACOM staff can be integrated in the form of liaison functions for service training, operations, and partner capacity building. This capability would meet the Army Chief of Staff's intent by bringing the Army in the lead for training and readiness in the Asia-Pacific.

We have to implement the new DoD [Department of Defense] strategic guidance, in which the Army in my mind plays a critical role. Odierno said, rebutting the idea that the 'pivot to Asia' sidelines land-base forces. [Odierno stated] I know there is a lot of water out there in the Pacific, but they're still land-centric...the most politically influential service tends to be the Army...it requires a joint force...you can't achieve, in my opinion, A2/AD with just air and sea.⁶⁰

Establishing a Pacific Training Command may also lead to the Army reassessing the management control of training enablers Army-wide. Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM), although not forward deployed, has training responsibilities and units assigned for PACOM's mission. Training enablers in USARPAC are managed through G3 operations to the Director of Army Training while enablers at JBLM are managed by Installation Management Command.⁶¹

Conclusion

Multinational partnerships will enable the U.S. to successfully promote regional stability in the Asia-Pacific. The land domain must be an equal partner and on the same level of consideration as the air and maritime domains for U.S. strategy development and resourcing to support the rebalancing efforts towards the Asia-Pacific. China's rise is certain and their actions to modernize ground forces and other services will provide a conventional threat in time of war. China's investment in A2/AD technology and weapons creates another dynamic that U.S. and multinational forces will need to counter and prepare for. The U.S. is best postured through alliances and establishing a synchronized tested JIIM environment to deter or defeat any adversary. Australia is a strong ally to the U.S. in the Pacific as is the U.S.-Britain relationship in the European theater. Australia is a geostrategic ally that could provide enhanced training support capabilities for multinational operations and best suited against A2/AD reach.

If the pivot to the Asia-Pacific is a priority for the 21st Century as stated by President Obama, have we set conditions for success in the Pacific region? Clearly USARPAC has made tremendous efforts but the focus has not been force-on-force to prepare for a conventional Army such as China. There is a continuing need to train for COE and full spectrum operations; however more emphasis must be equally placed on training for conventional forces in a joint multinational environment. The ability to build synchronized combat multinational power to combat an enemy such as China merits a forward deployed training command with a resident multinational CTC capability. The vast distance across USARPAC's area of responsibility provides a significant challenge with transportation costs for equipment associated with partnership capacity building and multinational exercises.⁶² One way to reduce costs is to provide prepositioned

training sets from various countries at a joint multinational training center in the Asia-Pacific. Movement of personnel only and light equipment to and from the joint multinational training center will significantly reduce these costs.

The U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific is primarily due to China's rise and their desires and actions to achieve economic and military super power status. This threat will not go away and the land component plays a crucial role in shaping how this threat will evolve. The largest allocation of land forces in PACOM's AOR is provided by USARPAC and as a forward deployed presence lacks a training command organization. Additionally, with USARPAC's partner capacity building need; nothing organizationally resembles USAREUR's JMTC command and control and lacks a resident CTC capability. There is an opportunity that should be pursued to build both a joint multinational training command and a joint multinational resident CTC capability under the land domain in the Asia-Pacific. The Army has taken 58 percent of the 2013 defense budget cuts which means the Air force, Navy, and Marines have taken a 42 percent reduction collectively.⁶³ The FY12 NDAA and report under section 346, outlines posture for PACOM to execute capacity building for nation partners and joint and combined training to enhance interoperability for multinational coalitions. Again, this report cautioned that current funding may not meet mission requirements to sustain regional stability.⁶⁴ The joint multinational training command and joint multinational CTC initiative may convince the PACOM commander to justify additional resources that will enhance the land domains relevancy in the 21st century in the Asia-Pacific.

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